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Once upon a time lived a royal family headed by the elderly Queen Elizabeth II. The 
twenty-first century royal fairytale plays out in global media culture: heirs and spares 
marry princesses in spectacular displays of pomp and ceremony; royal babies are 
displayed to crowds of well-wishers; royal lives are documented in dramatic restagings 
such as The Crown (Morgan, 2016) as tales of romance and glamour. While the monarchy 
has remained popular in Britain for decades, central to British heritage and folklore, pro-
royal sentiment in Britain has recently resurged (Ipsos Mori, 2016). This is particularly 
due to the popularity of the younger royals, the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge (‘Wills 
and Kate’) and the Duke and Duchess of Sussex (‘Harry and Meghan’), who perform(ed) 
an ‘image of everyday normality’ in a celebrity culture era (Littler, 2017: 124) as though 
part of an aspirational middle class (Clancy, forthcoming). Affective relationships 
between the royal family and ‘ordinary families’ are established through regular 
philanthropic projects, (carefully staged) media appearances, and benevolent giving 
(ibid.).  
 
Simultaneously, global wealth inequalities are widening. According to development 
charity Oxfam (2019), globally in 2019 just 26 people owned the same wealth as the 
poorest 3.8 billion, and in the UK the richest 1,000 people own more wealth than the 
poorest 40 per cent of households (The Equality Trust, 2017). In this context, sociology 
has reinvigorated its interest in ‘the elites’ (Savage and Williams, 2008; Khan, 2014; 
Savage, 2015; Sayer, 2015; Smith, 2016; Atkinson et al., 2017; Davis, 2018; Friedman and 
Laurison, 2019), inspired particularly by Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty First 
Century (2014), which analysed growing inequalities in relation to wealth, capital and 
investment.  
 
Much of this contemporary research on ‘the 1%’ (Dorling, 2014) explores transnational, 
meritocratic, neoliberal corporate power and the ‘new rich’, overlooking ‘old’ forms of 
political and institutional power in reproducing economic and cultural dis/advantage in 
Britain. Despite claims that landed power is in decline (Cannadine, 1990), investigative 
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journalist Guy Shrubsole (2019) demonstrates that long-established and land-based 
wealth holding (by, for example, the Crown, the aristocracy and the church) remains 
central to systems of power. These ‘traditional sources of wealth’, as Rowland Atkinson 
et al. write, ‘sit alongside – and increasingly interact with - the new global wealth elites 
and their expanding super-prime property portfolios’ (2017: 184), perhaps best 
exemplified by aristocrats like the Duke of Westminster.  Some scholarship shows how 
various forms of elite wealth – for example, ‘the idle rich, the famous, the charitable, the 
titled and the industrious’ (Biressi and Nunn, 2013: 119) – intersect and converge 
through comparable cultural, political, social and economic behaviours (Sayer, 2015; 
Smith, 2016; Littler, 2017; Edgerton, 2018). This research gap is perhaps partly explained 
by a sociological ‘turn away’ from earlier Marxist debates about the ruling class and 
economic class struggle. In so doing, Marxist frameworks like that of Silvia Federici 
(2004) and Ellen Meiksins Wood (1991, 1999) exploring how late capitalism remains 
rooted in historical forms of exploitation, extraction and class-based inequality are 
overlooked. Likewise, critical Marxist engagements considering the cultural political 
economy and historical materialism (Hall et al., 2013) are displaced.   
 
Taking this framing as a departure point, this article considers the monarchy within wider 
political economies of wealth and power, in a British context increasingly shaped by 
inequalities and systems of dis/advantage. In public and academic commentary, the 
British monarchy is often positioned as an archaic institution, an anachronism in relation 
to corporate forms of wealth and power, and therefore irrelevant. But what happens if 
monarchy is placed back at the centre of class analysis?    
 
This article emerges from a longer study on the British monarchy, which reads the 
political economy through culture (Clancy, forthcoming). That project analyses the 
cultural formations of monarchy in relation to its economic activities, to argue that media 
representations of the royal family are a prism; a central affective and ideological project 
to distance the monarchy from capitalist vulgarity and aristocratic debauchery, and 
reproduce monarchical power by ‘producing consent’ (Hall et al., 1978) for it in the 
public imaginary That research guides this article, but the focus here is on dismantling 
the symbolic royal fairytale, as described in this article’s opening, to reveal the mechanics, 
technologies and actors ‘behind the scenes’, and to expose the political-economic 
functions of the monarchy. 
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To do this, I first outline the conceptual framework by describing the monarchy as a 
corporation: ‘The Firm’. I detail the monarchy’s historical relationship with corporations 
and economic forms, to facilitate the unpacking of its political-economic significance 
today. The empirical data following this takes a classic journalistic approach of 
investigative research, consolidating a mass of material that was difficult to source due to 
the monarchy’s reliance on secrecy. This material ranges from media representations 
(newspapers, books, documentaries, social media, blogs); statistical data (surveys); 
government, constitutional and legal documents; material goods (merchandise); and 
critical academic material on monarchy. It incorporates “official” representations 
produced by the monarchy, activist/republican critiques, “objective” commentary by 
journalists/commentators, entertainment texts, fandom materials, and public 
commentary on social media. I use this data to map out the key material practices of The 
Firm: ‘Working for The Firm’ (staffing, wages, job roles), ‘The Economics of The Firm’ 
(funding and wealth, economic reporting, tax payments, investments and ownership, 
land), and ‘The Global Firm’ (histories of Empire and Commonwealth). This intricate 
description of what monarchy is today is intended as a provocation to sociological 
studies of elites to suggest that, in overlooking monarchy, we are overlooking a key 
component of late capitalism, and a key component in the reproduction of inequalities 
today. 
 
The Firm: Monarchy and Corporate Power  
To understand the monarchy as part of capitalist regimes, I (re)conceptualise the 
monarchy as a corporation: The Firm. The Firm is a common nickname for the British 
monarchy with a long history seeming to originate with George VI, who is quoted as 
stating ‘we are the Family Firm’ (in Brunt, 1992: 292), referring to the royal’s enactment 
of ‘family values’ during World War II (Pimlott, 2012). The term, and its shortened 
version ‘The Firm’, has since reportedly been adapted by Elizabeth II, and multiple 
media texts use the designation uncritically (Junor, 2006).1 This article takes the name 
more literally to figure the monarchy as a corporation, seeking to make visible the 




I frame the monarchy as corporation to distinguish from existing work that considers 
monarchy as brand (Balmer, 2009; Brand Finance Journal, 2012; Otnes and Maclaran, 
2015). Contemporary marketing literature understands branding as ‘distinguish[ing] a 
particular product or service from its competitors’ (Kotler et al., 2009: 425), which means 
differentiating products from other (similar) items. A brand operates externally, and to 
examine the royal brand is, to put it bluntly, analysing what they want you to see. That is, it 
reproduces the frameworks the monarchy is constructing. To understand the monarchy’s 
material practices, we must consider its historical, economic, political, social and cultural 
functions; functions often rendered invisible behind the symbols and spectacles of royal 
fairytale.  
 
The Crown is legally a common law corporation. Medieval law used Roman ideas of the 
body politic as ‘universitas, a corporation of the polity’, to distinguish between The Crown 
and the monarch’s natural body (Loughlin in Sunkin and Payne, 1999: 53), meaning laws 
made regarding, and assets belonging to, the monarch(y) will pass to the succeeding 
monarch (Clancy, forthcoming). Historically, The Crown used private corporations to 
manage public services, such as municipalities, universities or the Corporation of 
London, and to manage colonisation projects across the Empire (Robins, 2012). The 
Bubble Act 1720 decreed that chartered companies must be granted through Royal 
Charters – documents issued by The Crown  – and many monarchs benefitted directly 
from trade deals through custom duties (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003). The 
Companies Act 1862 made limited liability joint-stock companies distinct legal entities, 
granted the same rights as humans and negating Royal Charters (ibid.).	The Industrial 
Revolution initiated large-scale corporations, with multidivisional organisational 
structures (ibid.). Finally, the period since Elizabeth II’s 1953 coronation has shifted 
from the post-war welfare state to financial capital, neoliberal deregulation, free markets 
and privatisation (Harvey, 2005). 
 
Due to their global significance and historical entrenchment in state policy, as David 
Ciepley has argued, ‘corporations are government-like in their powers’ (2013). Moreover, 
in the Global North corporate values are embedded in practices of everyday life (Klein, 
2007). Corporate and civic citizenship increasingly intersect (Volcic and Andrejevic, 
2016; Negra and McIntyre, 2019), and corporate accumulation through dispossession, 
exploitation and extraction expands (Skeggs, 2019). This corporate power is increasingly 
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waged through capitalist dynasties such as the Bransons and the Trumps, where the 
family becomes ‘a site of commercial productivity’ (Pramaggiore and Negra, 2014: 89; see 
also Glucksberg and Burrows, 2016). Of course, The Firm is a family firm with a form of 
slavery at its core given its offspring must be royal. Framing the monarchy as a 
corporation is effective because corporations are organised around (im)moral modalities 
of exchange and logics of reciprocity, which The Firm achieves through (im/material) 
ideas of patronage, philanthropy, heritage and nationalism. As I demonstrate, this is 
perhaps clearest in journalistic calculations offsetting the monarchy’s economic cost with 
its social ‘value’ to demonstrate its worth(iness). This article illustrates that often the 
monarchy plays the same game as corporations to sustain itself in an increasingly 
networked world market. Yet rather than (or, in addition to) corruption, it uses ‘extra-
juridical’ forms of precedence rooted in the (uncodified) British constitution and political 
custom, exploiting this legal status to its advantage. In what follows, I map out what The 
Firm is today in order to put (histories of) capitalist formation back into 
conceptualisations of monarchy today. 
 
Working for The Firm  
While civil servants, military personnel and ministers could be considered monarchy 
employees (Wyatt in Sunkin and Payne, 1999), my narrative of domestic employment 
defines staff as those working in royal palaces. The Firm employs around 1,200 staff 
(Stockman, 2014) across the Royal Households, the largest being the Household of 
Elizabeth II at Buckingham Palace. This Household is overseen by the Lord 
Chamberlain, and work is departmentalised: the Lord Chamberlain’s Office (ceremonies, 
public events); the Private Secretary’s Office (constitutional and political duties, 
communications); The Privy Purse and Treasurer’s Office (finance); The Master of the 
Household’s Department (catering, hospitality, housekeeping); and the Royal Collection 
Trust (maintaining the Royal Collection) (Hoey, 2003; Burrell, 2004). This personnel 
organisation reflects bureaucratic multidivisional corporations, with the Queen the 
equivalent to Vice President, the Lord Chamberlain as Chairman, the Queen’s Private 
Secretary as Managing Director/Chief Executive, and Heads of Department as sector 
managers. 
 
Accounts from inside the Household suggest a strictly demarcated staff hierarchy usually 
built around proximity to the royals (Barry, 1983) and policed by a dramaturgy of ritual 
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and etiquette. They have segregated dining locations/timings, whereby ‘junior members’ 
(butlers, housekeepers) eat self-service meals using plastic seats and plastic cutlery; 
‘officials’ (long-serving staff, dressers, chauffeurs) dine on upholstered chairs with silver 
cutlery; ‘senior officials’ (personal secretaries, press officers) are permitted sherry or wine, 
and ‘members’ (ladies-in-waiting, Private Secretary) are served by junior staff (Burrell, 
2004). There are inconsistent hiring practices and enormous variations in wages and 
benefits. While senior staff are typically headhunted and often employed without formal 
interview (Somerset, 1984; Hoey, 2003; Arbiter, 2014), lower-level staff must complete 
an application form, undertake an interview, and sometimes attend an Assessment Day 
(Brookes, 2015). A Housekeeping Assistant position was advertised in 2015 at 
£14,513.16 per annum (The Royal Household, 2015), which, presuming a 37.5 hours per 
week contract (it advertises for ‘five days’), is barely more than the 2015 London living 
wage of £9.40 per hour.2 Pay scales for senior staff are not advertised, but biographer 
Brian Hoey (2011) suggested that in 2011 the Queen’s Private Secretary was paid 
£146,000 and the Keeper of the Privy Purse £180,000. In 2011-12, pay was frozen for 
staff earning over £21,000 (National Audit Office, 2013), but reports suggested some of 
the top earners saw increases of up to 6.4 per cent regardless (Press Association, 2013; 
McClure, 2014). This reflects how UK elite wages continue to rise after the North 
Atlantic financial crash and austerity economics, despite average UK household income 
decreasing (Elliott, 2017). Meanwhile, reflecting the global ‘gig economy’ model, 
temporary contracts are used across Royal Households. Some cleaners are agency staff 
(Shakespeare, 2015); footmen are sourced from elite colleges for unpaid “internships” at 
state banquets (Hoey, 2003); and 350 part-time summer staff worked on zero-hour 
contracts for Buckingham Palace’s summer opening in 2013 (Neville et al., 2013).  
 
White male employees dominate. The government’s 2018 gender pay gap report showed 
that women in the Royal Household are paid 12.39 per cent less than men (Palmer, 
2018), and the first black equerry was only hired in 2017 (Pells, 2017). Although the 
official Royal website includes a ‘diversity and inclusion’ policy stating they ‘raise 
awareness of diversity and equal opportunities throughout our workforce’, and hire 
purely on merit (Official Website of the British Monarchy, 2016) it does not detail how 
this occurs (indeed, the gender pay gap suggests it is ineffective). Statistics on racial 
diversity within the Royal Household are not available. In 1997, The Independent revealed 
that statutory policies on ethnic monitoring of staff, used across the UK for decades, was 
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not being used by The Firm (Bevins, 1997). In response, they claimed ‘the number of 
current employees from an ethnic minority background is about 5 per cent… in line with 
ethnic minority representation across the civil service’ (ibid.). The civil service figure was 
actually 18.4 per cent in Greater London, and The Firm undertook no ethnic monitoring 
of current staff by position, making it impossible to calculate whether BAME employees 
were fairly distributed across pay grades (ibid.). In 2001 Elizabeth Burgess, a black 
woman and former personal assistant to Prince Charles, went to tribunal over 
discrimination and racist bullying by other staff (Pells, 2017). Her claims were dismissed. 
 
In addition to underpaid, under-rewarded ‘domestic’ staff, over-representation from elite 
schools, landowners and titled families suggest accumulations of class privilege in senior 
members. For example the Lord Chamberlain William James Robert Peel is a House of 
Lords peer (The Peerage, 2015), and ex-Private Secretary Sir Christopher Geidt owns a 
365-acre sheep farm (Kerevan, 2015). There are also cross-institutional relationships, 
with three key previous and/or future employers among senior staff: corporations, 
broadcasters and the civil service. This ‘revolving door’ (Davis, 2018: 126) between 
Establishment networks is typical of elite institutions to preserve privilege and wealth. 
Keeper of the Privy Purse Sir Alan Reid and his deputy Michael Stevens have both 
worked for finance corporation KPMG (The Telegraph, 2011). The Private Secretary 
Edward Young was previously Deputy Head of Corporate Public Relations at Barclays 
Bank (Pascoe-Watson, 2012), and the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge’s 
Communication Secretary, Jason Knauf, was Director of Corporate Affairs at RBS 
(Rayner, 2014a). This reveals how corporate businessmen appeal to Royal Household 
strategies, demonstrating the merging of ‘new’ and ‘old’ money.  
 
Several senior Household members have worked for key inter/national broadcasters: 
Edward Young was Head of Communications at Granada (Pascoe-Watson, 2012), and 
Sally Osman (ex-Director of Royal Communications) was Director of Corporate 
Communications for Sony, Director of Communications for BBC, and Director of Press 
and PR for Channel 5 and British Sky Broadcasting (Rayner, 2013). This suggests The 
Firm has access to broadcast institutions through interdependent relationships, and that 
The Firm’s communications team have a skill in packaging royal events in digestible ways 
for the news cycle.  
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Just as early modern courts were populated by aristocrats and noblemen at the centre of 
government and society (Elias, 1983), The Firm’s court includes influential figures. Sally 
Osman, James Roscoe (ex-Communications Secretary to the Queen) and Jason Knauf  
were listed in the Evening Standard’s ‘Progress 1000: London’s most influential people 
2017’ in the ‘Communicators: Media’ category (Evening Standard, 2017). Meanwhile, the 
Private Secretary is part of a ‘golden triangle’ of senior royal courtiers and civil servants, 
alongside the Cabinet Secretary and the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary (Watt, 2014). 
The Private Secretary (who has always been male) communicates between the monarch 
and government (Bogdanor, 1995), coordinates official correspondence, and organises 
the monarch’s programme (including writing speeches). Paul H. Emden suggests ‘to 
prescribe the limits of his activities, to fix once and for all the sphere of his influence, is 
impossible’ (1934: 14). Despite its importance, the position evolved organically and is 
neither elected nor well known (Bogdanor, 1995). 
 
Some roles are always filled by aristocrats, such as Ladies-in-Waiting (Hoey, 2003). These 
positions are not advertised but rely on personal contacts, and Ladies-in-Waiting are 
unpaid (aside from travel expenses) and work in a two-weeks-on-four-weeks-off pattern 
(Somerset, 1984). With no pay, the role functions as a mark of honour (The Royal Post, 
2013), and as an aristocratic classed dedication to the reproduction of royal power. It is 
also an example of unpaid gendered domestic labour.  
 
Questions are raised about staff’s investment in reproducing The Firm when they 
experience poor wages and living conditions. Stephen Barry, Prince Charles’s valet, said 
many staff ‘are natural royalists who work for the monarchy for the same romantic 
reasons I did’ (1985: 20), and motivations pivot on moral economies of class 
subservience. Even senior household members are paid less than in comparable 
corporate institutions, suggesting that the networks, privileges and status the Royal 
Household affords is important across the employment divide. The workforce is 
essentially bifurcated with, on the one hand, low- to middle-income ‘domestic workers’ 
who do the essential, daily, unglamorous work of maintaining The Firm, and then a 
symbolically and politically important group of senior and honorary staff who are linked 
into broader British elites and have ‘real’ social, cultural and political power. Either way, 
all are key to reproducing The Firm as a national institution and in reproducing corporate 
power across the ‘revolving door’ (Davis, 2018: 126) of the elites. 
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The Economics of The Firm  
The British government has provided funds to the monarch since 1688 (Tomkins in 
Sunkin and Payne, 1999). A fixed payment developed to give parliament more control 
over expenditure, where previously it fluctuated with each monarch’s whims (ibid.). 
Between 1760-2011, this was the Civil List: an annual payment, rising with inflation, in 
return for the Crown Estate profits, a portfolio of land and property belonging to The 
Crown (National Audit Office, 2013). The last Civil List payment in March 2011 was 
£7.9 million (ibid.). This was supplemented by grants-in-aid, which funded official 
engagements, travel (including helicopter, chartered flights and the royal train), and 
property maintenance (ibid.). In 2015, royal travel cost £4 million (Herald Scotland, 
2016). Crucially, only the Queen claimed from the Civil List. The Dukes and Duchesses 
of Cornwall, Cambridge and Sussex are financed by profits from the Duchy of Cornwall, 
and other members receive income from the Privy Purse (Brand Finance Journal, 2012). 
The Privy Purse comprises surplus income from the Duchy of Lancaster, another 
portfolio of Crown land and property, which totaled £20 million in 2017 (Prynn, 2017; 
the Duchy is valued at £534 million). Funding was completed by the Queen’s ‘personal 
income’ from her ‘private’ investment portfolio (including the Balmoral and 
Sandringham Estates; ibid.). The concept of ‘personal wealth’ is questionable considering 
the monarchy’s history of extraction, enclosure and exploitation (Clancy, forthcoming).  
 
In October 2011, the Civil List and grants-in-aid were replaced with the Sovereign Grant 
(the Duchy of Cornwall, the Privy Purse and ‘personal’ funding remain). This restructure 
aimed to improve accountability, and the annual payment is now calculated from a 
percentage of the Crown Estate’s net income, with the National Audit Office and Public 
Accounts Committee undertaking regular examinations (National Audit Office, 2013). 
However, as anti-monarchy campaigners Republic report (2015), concerns arising from 
these examinations are routinely dismissed by the government. Furthermore, although 
the Financial Times used financial capitalist language to describe the Sovereign Grant as 
‘performance-related pay’ (Shrimsley, 2011), and this was the aim of the restructure, the 
payment does not reflect actual profits/losses of the Crown Estate. A House of 
Commons Research Paper stated this was merely ‘a means of arriving at a figure’ 
(Bowers and Cracknell, 2011). This lack of accountability is reflected in recent payment 
increases. In 2011, The Firm received 15 per cent of the Crown Estate’s net income 
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surplus (National Audit Office, 2013), but in 2017 the Royal Trustees (the Prime 
Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Keeper of the Privy Purse) agreed to 
25 per cent, plus an additional 10 per cent annually to fund the 10-year ‘Reservicing of 
Buckingham Palace’ project. This amounted to £82.2 million in 2018-19 (The Royal 
Household of Queen Elizabeth II, 2019), up from £40 million in 2014-15 (Republic, 
2015). As David McClure puts it, paraphrasing the Financial Times, this bears ‘a 
remarkable resemblance to the generous performance-related pay packages granted to 
business executives by their indulgent boards’ (2014: 422).   
 
Since 1993, The Firm has published annual finance reports purporting to encourage 
financial accountability (for example, The Royal Household of Queen Elizabeth II, 
2019). However, figures are routinely obscured. For the Sovereign Grant increase 
described above, the 2017-18 report first highlighted a ‘core’ Sovereign Grant of £45.7 
million, with the additions in the subsequent paragraph (The Royal Household of Queen 
Elizabeth II, 2018). Likewise, the Queen’s report only includes Sovereign Grant income, 
ignoring other operational costs ‘cross-subsidis[ed]’ by government departments 
(McClure, 2014: 419). The Department for Culture, Media and Sport fund ceremonials; 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office fund state visits; the Ministry of Defence pays 
equerries and orderlies wages; the Home Office provides security and police support; 
(National Audit Office, 2013); and the Queen’s country estates receive European Union 
farming subsidies of over £1 million (Brexit will likely end this agreement; Riley-Smith, 
2016; Moore, 2016). Journalists also uncovered that The Firm attempted to claim funds 
to heat Buckingham Palace under an energy-saving scheme designed for low-income 
families (Verkaik, 2010a). A Sovereign Grant clause states funding can never decrease 
even if Crown Estate profits do, but can increase when profits go up (Republic, 2015; 
especially pertinent given the austerity cuts to public instititions like the NHS), reflecting 
a more pervasive neoliberal practice which socialises losses and privatises profits. 
Discourses of accountability, then, seem merely to assuage public opinion around elite 
privilege (Littler, 2017), and reflect the corporate accounting of global companies like 
Amazon which ‘manipulate results’ to appeal to shareholders (Sherman and Young, 
2016).  
 
By law, The Crown is exempt from taxation, and the Sovereign Grant is exempt from 
income tax (HM Government, 2013). In 1993, responding to public anger over royal 
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spending, The Firm agreed to pay ‘voluntary’ income and capital gains tax on the Privy 
Purse and private investments, but only ‘to the extent that the income is not used for 
official purposes’ (The Royal Household of Queen Elizabeth II, 2019: 7). The Crown is 
also exempt from inheritance tax on ‘sovereign to sovereign bequests’ (Marr, 2011: 295). 
The Queen does pay council tax on her properties: £1.4 million in 2018 (The Royal 
Household of Queen Elizabeth II, 2019). In 2017, leaked documents from two offshore 
tax havens in the Cayman Islands revealed that the Duchy of Lancaster had followed 
multiple global corporations to use offshore private equity funds to avoid paying tax on 
its holdings (Osborne, 2017). These investments had been put into multiple businesses, 
including BrightHouse, Britain’s largest rent-to-own retailer ‘criticised for exploiting 
thousands of poor families’ (ibid.) by charging huge interest rates on purchases using cost 
credit. Despite controversy, The Firm has never publically apologised (Clancy, 
forthcoming).  
 
Due to skewed and/or omitted figures, The Firm’s wealth is equally difficult to calculate. 
This is perhaps attributable to misunderstood differences between the Queen’s ‘personal 
investments’ and property of The Crown. The Queen’s ‘personal investments’ are assets 
legally hers to maintain, use or sell (Marr, 2011), including the Balmoral and Sandringham 
estates, ‘personal possessions’, and ‘personal investment portfolios’ held by blue-chip 
subsidiary Bank of England Nominees – a dormant company exempt from disclosing its 
accounts (Bates, 2015). Properties of The Crown, meanwhile, are held in trust for the 
nation by the Sovereign, passing to the new Sovereign upon succession. These include 
the Crown Estate, the Duchy of Lancaster, Royal Collection artwork3, most palaces and 
castles, jewellery (including the Crown Jewels), and land. Because the Queen is not 
entitled to these profits, they are often omitted from ‘official’ calculations, although 
Republic (2015) argue that citizens lose profits accruing from them. 
 
The Crown Estate is a portfolio of land and property belonging to The Crown, while the 
Duchy of Lancaster is owned by the sovereign as the Duke of Lancaster, and the Duchy 
of Cornwall by the Duke of Cornwall, currently Prince Charles (see Clancy, forthcoming 
for an analysis of the latter). The Crown Estate incorporates UK residential and 
commercial property, including the entirety of London’s Regent Street, most of St 
James’s Park, some of Regent’s Park, Kensington Palace Gardens, Eltham, Richmond, 
Egham and Hampton; three shopping centres; fourteen retail parks; most of the UK’s 
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seabed and foreshore including wind, wave and tidal power, marine aggregates and 
minerals, cables and pipelines; and 336,000 acres of agricultural land and forestry (The 
Crown Estate, 2016a). In 2018, it announced a capital value of £14.1 billion (The Crown 
Estate, 2018). It is described as an ‘independent commercial business’ (The Crown 
Estate, 2016b) separate from monarchy but run on its behalf. However, much of its 
portfolio was ‘stolen from the Church at the time of the Reformation’ or conquered by 
historical monarchs (Duncan, 1970: 194). In 2019, The Guardian (Murphy, 2019) revealed 
that over five years 113 Crown Estate tenants were evicted so the homes could be sold 
for profit, and over 100 complaints from tenants (about leaks, faulty electrics, etc.) were 
received in two years, prompting questions about the management’s morality considering 
the Crown Estate is a custodian rather than a commercial estate agent. As described 
earlier, landed wealth remains central to systems of power in Britain, across both the 
persistence of the aristocracy and corporations investing in land for financialisation 
(Shrubsole, 2019). Likewise, Brett Christophers (2019) and Beverley Skeggs (2019) argue 
that late capitalism has turned (back) to capitalist formations based on rent, 
expropriation, enclosure and exploitation to extract profit and value. Failures in land 
reform, described by Michael Tichelar (2018), also contribute towards understanding the 
resilience of the landed classes. This demonstrates further interrelations between the 
economic models of monarchy and corporate, financial capitalism (see Clancy, 
forthcoming for more on The Firm and land). 
 
When laid bare, these figures are staggering. However, royal funding and/or wealth is 
offset in public discourse against notions of their wider cultural, historical or economic 
‘value’ to British society. Headlines such as ‘Thank you Ma’am: Royals earn Britain nearly 
£2billion a year’ (Palmer, 2017), ‘The Queen costs her subjects 60p each a year’ (Davies, 
2003) and ‘Monarchy attracts £500 million a year from overseas tourists’ (Gammell, 
2010) use mathematical calculations to appeal to capitalist logics of ‘value for money’ and 
exchange.4 Likewise, The Firm’s initiatives suggest the production and distribution of 
broader economic value, such as endorsing goods, practices, or places – the honours 
system, for example, (see Harper, 2015) – or philanthropic/patronage projects described 
as ‘royal work’ to position the royals as productive forces in a labour market (see Clancy, 
forthcoming). Of course, as I demonstrate, this is not a process of exchange among 
equals at all. Rather, like David Graeber argues (2013) of broader economic histories, 
while economic relations are embedded in ideologies of morality - for instance, debt 
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repayment as a moral imperative - in fact hierarchies order moral relations of inequality, 
conducted as logics of precedence and privilege. Indeed, the legal bases for monarchical 
privileges are entrenched in past actions informing present propriety, whilst affective 
investments in the royal family– across both public and media cultures – offset the cost of 
monarchy against moral economies. Hence, historical relations of monarchical wealth 
accumulation are obscured. 
 
This account has exposed where monarchical funding comes from, how it gets 
concealed, and how The Firm exploits ancient prerogatives to reproduce wealth in late 
capitalist Britain. As Ellen Meiksin Wood argues, Britain has ‘a kind of ‘bastard 
capitalism’ with a pre-modern state and antiquated ruling ideologies’ (1991: 1) that affect 
the entire system, structuring relations between ‘new’ and ‘old’ elites.  
 
The Global Firm  
Contemporary financial capitalism is a transnational project (Sassen, 2001)., Marxist 
feminist and black Marxist work describes capitalism’s dependency on population 
subjugation through exploitation, extraction, conquest, displacement and slavery 
(Williams, 1964; Federici, 2004; Lowe, 2015). For example, corporations undertook 
colonisation projects across the British Empire, run on behalf of the British State and the 
monarch. The East India Company was granted a Royal Charter in 1600, and used its 
private army to rule millions and establish monopolies over global trade (Robins, 2012). 
The British Empire implemented violent regimes of genocide, famine, enslavement, 
indentured labour, imprisonment and torture, all presided over (and partly funded) by the 
monarch(y) (Beckles, 2012). Likewise, The Firm continues to use, and extract value from, 
goods stolen during colonisation, such as the Koh-i-Noor diamond from India used in 
the crown jewels (Dalrymple, 2017). Analysing The Firm’s global interests reveals how 
The Firm reshapes itself in response to changes in capital and global governance, moving 
from the household to the globe. 
 
The Commonwealth is a transnational organisation of 52 ‘independent and equal’ 
member states headed by the Queen, promoting principles of peace and security, human 
rights, tolerance, and access to health, education, food and shelter through the 
Commonwealth Charter (The Commonwealth, 2013). These ‘shared values’ have proved 
contentious. Philip Murphy describes the Charter as ‘so poorly drafted that it leaves the 
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nature of [the nations’] commitment [to particular values] completely unclear’ (2018: 
156). This is illustrated in some member states’ human rights records, such as 
criminalising homosexuality despite the Charter’s ‘discrimination clause’ (ibid.). The 
Commonwealth also has imperial origins. Many member states are former British 
colonies, and Murphy describes the ‘haphazard’ way ‘‘Imperial’ became 
‘Commonwealth’’ (2018: 43). Holly Randell-Moon argues ‘the secular autonomy of 
settler states is buttressed by Crown sovereignty’ (2016: 41) with regular royal visits to 
promote ties. The enshrining of neocolonialism through organised alliances is notable 
considering how contemporary authoritarian populist politics draws on affective, colonial 
nostalgia (Virdee and McGeever, 2017; Yelin and Clancy, forthcoming). The Firm 
functions in this nostalgia as representative of ‘traditional’, conservative, specifically 
English national identity (Clancy, forthcoming) that must be ‘protected’. For example, as 
I explore elsewhere (ibid.), the misogynistic, racist comments about Meghan Markle’s 
marriage into The Firm, which draw on white supremacist discourses that position 
interracial marriage as tarnishing (royal) blood purity, demonstrate how (nostalgia about) 
royal whiteness can be mobilised to spread far-right populist propaganda. 
 
While the London Declaration 1949 permitted Commonwealth countries – as ‘free and 
equal members’ – to adopt republicanism, sixteen remain constitutional monarchies with 
Elizabeth II as a legally distinct Head of State (Ritchie and Markwell, 2006). These 
include Caribbean islands like Barbados, African states such as Ghana, and Australia and 
Canada (Estep, 1993). Canada was unified in 1867 and Australia in 1901, when each 
developed independent constitutions as self-governing dominions, while vesting 
‘executive power’ in the British Crown (Estep, 1993: 225). They nominate a local 
governor-general as the Queen’s representative, with the power to propose legislation, 
(dis)prove bills and dissolve parliament (Boyce, 2008). Although the Queen has no 
‘direct’ political control in these realms, governor-generals can be interpreted as ongoing 
monarchical administrative power. Likewise, as Caribbean sociologist Ty Salandy writes, 
the British Empire was partly consolidated by ‘the violence of ‘knowledge’… spreading a 
narrow and ideological system of values, culture and information’ to form a ‘global 
model of civilization’ (Salandy, 2018). Adopting ‘God Save the Queen/King’ as the 
national or royal anthem, for example (still used in Australia, Jamaica, Grenada, Saint 
Lucia, Tuvalu and Barbados, amongst others), instills British values and subservience to 
colonial authority by evoking monarch(y). Additionally, intergovernmental agency The 
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Commonwealth Secretariat runs the Commonwealth, describing itself as a ‘civil society’: 
‘a body accountable to “the people” of the Commonwealth’ (Murphy, 2018: 51). Yet, it 
relies on a ‘corporatist model’ where ‘‘civil society’ consultations’ are dominated by 
corporate groups (ibid.), such as the Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council 
which promotes intra-Commonwealth trade and investment between government and 
private sectors (CWEIC, 2017). 
 
The Firm has further interests in international trade. Prince Andrew ‘worked’ for the UK 
government in the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills as the Special 
Representative for International Trade and Investment. This ended in 2011, following 
reports that Andrew profited personally from trade deals. He allegedly exploited his 
personal relationship with Kazakh oligarch Kenges Rakishev to broker a £885 million 
deal between a Greek and Swiss consortium and the Kazakhstan government, receiving 
£4 million commission (Telegraph Reporters, 2016). In 2007, he sold his Berkshire 
country estate Sunninghill Park to Kazakh oligarch Timur Kulibayev for £3 million 
above the asking price, and in 2011 he allegedly lobbied British bank and wealth manager 
Coutts to accept Kulibayev as a client (ibid.). Ex-Foreign Office Minister Chris Bryant 
claimed ‘it was very difficult to see in whose interests [Andrew] was acting’ (Sawer, 2016). 
Likewise, some royal visits to places like Saudi Arabia have coincided with arms trade 
sales by BAE systems, suggesting the royals are used to broker corporate sales (Margrain, 
2017). The Firm’s global interests demonstrate how it follows finance capital models, 
operating across borders to (re)produce wealth and power.  
 
Conclusion  
This article aimed to trouble typical accounts of the British monarchy as an archaic 
institution, an anachronism in relation to corporate forms of wealth and power, and 
therefore irrelevant. To do this, it conceptualised the monarchy as a corporation: The 
Firm. The article mapped what monarchy is today to expose its corporate interests: from 
exploiting low-paid workers; the ‘revolving door’ (Davis, 2018: 126) between the Royal 
Household and other institutions; ambiguous royal finances; networks of contacts; 
abusing neo/colonialism; and misusing political privileges.  
 
It also described the moral economies (Graeber, 2013) that accompany political 
economies of monarchy. On one hand, The Firm is wealth ‘made visible’ as institutional 
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and ceremonial classed power. Concomitantly, the sources, mechanisms and processes of 
this wealth are rendered invisible and inscrutable. I describe elsewhere (Clancy, 2019: 
442) how this balance of in/visibility is a ‘point of anxiety’ of The Firm, not solely 
through ‘branding’ but through various material sets of organisation. In this article, 
visibility is controlled to avoid scrutiny, and is partly achieved through moral economies 
which conceptualise The Firm as ‘value (for money)’, or exploit workers through notions 
of class subservience. It is notable that the relations described in this piece are not 
commonly known. It is this balance of in/visibility that facilitates our affective 
investments in monarchy, and influences our moral attitudes to extreme inequalities. 
Only when romanticised representations of monarchy are fractured - as recently with 
Prince Andrew’s role in convicted pedophile Jeffrey Epstein’s sex trafficking of young 
girls, or Prince Harry and Meghan Markle’s resignation from royal life - are the 
corruptions and inequalities in The Firm made temporarily visible (Clancy and Yelin, 
forthcoming). Indeed, Harry and Meghan’s departure – which occurred after the 
completion of this article – indicates perhaps the most seismic shift in The Firm in recent 
decades, with the repercussions still playing out across media and political culture.    
 
This argument is not only relevant to Britain. As I have shown in relation to histories of 
Empire and the Commonwealth, the international relevancy of The Firm indicates its 
global political-ideological significance in terms of reproducing inequalities and privilege: 
normalising elite wealth (Littler, 2017; Clancy, forthcoming) and shoring up racial 
capitalist structures and (neo)colonial exploitation both economically (goods stolen 
during Empire) and culturally (patronage visits to Commonwealth nations). Likewise, this 
research contributes to literature considering other global monarchies and their role in 
contemporary capitalist structures (Hanieh, 2018) or the persistence of ‘old’ wealth in 
capitalist accumulation (Shrubsole, 2019). 
 
The article has demonstrated the importance of including monarchy in analyses of class 
and inequality. While ‘elite’ research has increased in response to growing global 
inequalities, that work largely overlooks hereditary and ‘old’ wealth, or Marxist 
conceptualisations of ‘the ruling class’. How does the economic form of wealth (financial 
capital) play out in social forms of inequality in Britain today? How do ‘new’ forms of 
capital support and legitimate ‘older’ forms of power? This article details why a critical 
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sociology of monarchy is so timely: how can we understand social inequalities today 
























































 																																																								1	George VI’s ‘the Family Firm’ softens and distracts from institutional operations using 
notions of familial intimacy and the Victorian association between family businesses and 
morality. See Clancy, forthcoming. 	2	Since writing this article, the official royal website has removed salary information from many of the job advertisements.	3 Bates (2015) estimates this to be approximately 7,000 paintings, 40,000 watercolours and 150,000 prints (from artists such as 
Rembrandt and da Vinci), plus eighteenth century French furniture, statues, and tapestries. 4	These calculations are usually based on the annual finance reports, which as described 
are often inaccurate	
